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In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally
about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents.An advantage of this approach is that
win–win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as
simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the
actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining
strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-
search strategies focus on the conceding and win–win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An
important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search
methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use
of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining
outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy. © 2006
Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatedbilateralnegotiationformsanimportanttypeofinteractioninagent
based systems for electronic commerce.1 It allows seller and customer to deter-
mine the terms and content of the trade iteratively and bilaterally. Consequently,
deals may be highly customized ~especially for complex goods or services! and
highly adaptable to changing circumstances. Moreover, by automating the negoti-
ation, the potentially time-consuming process is delegated to autonomous soft-
ware agents who conduct the actual negotiation on behalf of their owners.
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~www.interscience.wiley.com!. • DOI 10.1002/int.20122In particular, information goods mark an application area where negotiating
through the use of autonomous software agents may be beneficial. ~For informa-
tion goods, the cost of producing one additional unit is virtually zero.! Software,
news articles, stock quotes, research reports, music, and video clips are all exam-
ples of information goods. Information goods are often sold through on-line ser-
vices where customers pay a nonnegotiable subscription fee. Reuters News
Services,Apple’s iTunes Music Store, and Microsoft’s DotNet ~MSDN! are exam-
ples of this practice. Generally, customers have only an interest in a limited subset
of, for example, all the news articles, music, or software available through such
on-line services. Especially, with a high heterogeneity among customers and a lot
of dynamics in customer preferences, offering nonnegotiable subscriptions may
not be the best solution. Bargaining has, on the contrary, the advantage of provid-
ing more flexibility and adaptability toward the preferences of individual custom-
ers and daily dynamics. In this article, we therefore consider the problem of a
seller and customer agent negotiating bilaterally about the subscription fee of such
an on-line service.
Most commonly, businesses use an instance of an n-part tariff as the non-
negotiable subscription fee: An n-part tariff specifies a fixed price ~or fee!, n 1
variable prices, and the corresponding n1 “intervals” in which the variable prices
are applicable; the quantity or more generally the quality of the goods purchased is
used to define these intervals. Given the charged tariff, a customer will choose the
desired quantity or more generally the desired quality of the good or service on
sale.Agood example of a nonnegotiable two-part tariff is the practice of network
operators for mobile phones; they charge a fixed subscription fee and a variable
price per minute called. Charging a nonnegotiable two-part tariff is especially a
naturalchoiceincaseofuncertaintyinthequantityorqualitycustomerswillchoose
to purchase ~e.g., minutes called in a month!.
In this article, we consider the novel approach of software agents negotiating
about a two-part tariff. For most practical applications, it suffices to focus on nego-
tiating about a two-part tariff for the following three reasons ~see Section 3 for a
more in-depth discussion!. First, negotiating about such tariffs has the advantage,
over one-part tariffs, of generating win–win opportunities. Second, negotiating
about more complex tariffs will often generate very few additional win–win oppor-
tunities, while the issue of preference elicitation may become problematic. Third,
negotiating about a two-part tariff has the same discriminative power as non-
negotiable m  1-part tariffs ~m  2 being the number of customers!, whereas
individual customers do not have to understand the more complex m 1-part tar-
iff.Therefore, price discrimination will not be a motive for negotiating about more
complex tariffs.
We address the issue of negotiating about a two-part tariff by decomposing
bargaining strategies into two parts: Pareto-search methods and concession strat-
egies. Pareto-search methods aim at utilizing the win–win aspect of multi-issue
bargaining; they determine the relative magnitude of the multiple issues, during
the bargaining process. At the same time ~but independently! a concession strategy
determines the desired utility level of a deal during the bargaining process.
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Pareto-search methods that result in efficient solutions while, at the same time,
bargainers make concessions using a variety of concession strategies. To that end,
we introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF method: two Pareto-search meth-
ods. The orthogonal-DF combines the orthogonal search method with an amplify-
ingmechanism,theDerivativeFollower~withadaptivestepsize!.Weshowthrough
computer experiments that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods
by the two bargainers—combined with various concession strategies—results in
very efficient bargaining outcomes when bargaining about two-part tariffs; that
is, these outcomes closely approximate Pareto-efficient bargaining solutions.a
Note that we obtain these results without assuming any prior knowledge of the
opponent’s preferences: A simultaneous use of the orthogonal method by one and
orthogonal-DF by the other bargainer results in bargainers learning to close effi-
cient deals through an alternating exchange of offers and counteroffers.
Clearly, bargainers are generally free to choose strategies other than a Pareto-
efficient-search method combined with a concession strategy. Fully rational bar-
gainers who view the bargaining process as a one-shot game will not necessarily
opt for such an approach. Bargaining between customer and seller is, however,
generally conducted repeatedly. Obtaining win–win ~Pareto-efficient! deals can
therefore be a goal for both seller and buyer, to avoid unnecessary loss of payoff
for the opponent.Aseller may care, for instance, more about long-term profitabil-
ity. Exploiting win–win opportunities can contribute to such a long-term goal,
because it results in a higher customer satisfaction, which can lead to returning
customers ~without necessarily reducing the short-term profit!. To give rise to the
slightly cooperative aspect of repeated bargaining, negotiators can use the devel-
opedPareto-searchmethodswithaself-selectedconcessionstrategy.Itgoesbeyond
the scope of the article to discuss exhaustively under which exact conditions bar-
gainers have an incentive to choose the approach of decomposing bargaining strat-
egies. The point we make in this article is that the developed decomposition of the
bargaining strategy into Pareto-search methods and concession strategies can be
an important option for bargainers; it results in efficient deals while still leaving
room for noncooperative behavior through bargainers’concession strategy.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we relate
the article to the literature. In Section 3, we explain in greater detail that, when
negotiating about a tariff, it suffices to consider only two-part tariffs for most prac-
tical applications. In Section 4, we discuss the customer and seller agent. In Sec-
tion 5, we introduce the approach of disentangling multi-issue bargaining strategies
into Pareto-search methods and concession strategies. Moreover, we develop the
orthogonal and orthogonal-DF methods: two Pareto-search methods.To assess the
relative performance of the developed Pareto-search method we consider other
standard techniques as candidate Pareto-search methods in Section 6. In Section 7,
aAn offer constitutes a Pareto improvement compared to another offer whenever it makes
one bargainer better off without making the other worse off. An offer is said to be Pareto effi-
cient whenever there does not exist a different offer that constitutes a Pareto improvement.
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puter experiments we investigate the efficiency of the introduced bargaining
approach. Conclusions follow in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
With one-issue negotiation, bargainers only need to determine the ~desired!
utility level of a ~counter! offer. Negotiating over more than one issue complicates
things; bargainers also need to determine the magnitude of the various issues. By
making clever trade-offs between various issues, win–win or Pareto improve-
mentsmayoccur .InRef.2aheuristicisintroducedthattriestofindParetoimprove-
ments by searching for the most similar offer, given a desired utility level. They
use fuzzy similarity criteria because most of the considered issues take on very
limited discrete values. Based on these similarity criteria, an iterative hill-climbing
algorithm is used to find the most similar offer. This hill-climbing algorithm is
limited, however, to linearly additive utility functions.
In this article, we develop the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF, two Pareto
search methods. Like the heuristic developed in Ref. 2, the orthogonal search
method tries to find Pareto improvements by searching for the most similar offer,
given a desired utility level. We, however, consider negotiation over a continuous
issue ~or issue that can take on many values!. For this problem domain, Euclidean
distance is a more natural choice as the similarity criterion. With Euclidean dis-
tance, standard mathematical techniques ~from fields such as convex analysis! are
immediatelyatourdisposal.Moreover,implementingthesimilaritycriterionentails
a straightforward application of standard techniques from numerical analysis. The
orthogonal search method finds—from the collection of offers that have the desired
utility level—the offer closest to the opponent’s last offer, measured in Euclidean
distance. Unlike the heuristics developed in Ref. 2, it is not restricted to linearly
additive utility functions.
An important limitation of any search method using similarity criteria only—
such as the orthogonal search method and the heuristics developed in Ref. 2—is
that the rate of convergence depends solely on bargainers’ preferences and the
chosen similarity criteria. This convergence rate is often very slow. The
orthogonal-DF combines the orthogonal search method with an amplifying mech-
anism, the Derivative Follower ~with adaptive step size!. Consequently, it can very
quickly converge to a Pareto-efficient solution.
Slow rate of convergence is especially a problem whenever software agents
are not a priori restricted. In that case, bargainers may simultaneously make a
concession ~i.e., adjust the desired utility level! and search for clever trade-offs.
Due to these concessions, the Pareto-efficient solution, to which a search method
converges, also changes. With a very slow convergence rate, very little improve-
ment in the efficiency can be realized before a deal is closed. Thus the heuristic
developed in Ref. 2 may need a lot of time to find a Pareto-efficient solution, time
that may not be available due to bargainers making concessions simultaneously.
The developed orthogonal-DF needs less time and consequently can also work
very well in conjunction with concessions.
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cessions and searching for clever trade-offs is generally avoided by assuming an
intermediary.3–9 The mediator is inspired by the idea of a single negotiation text
~SNT!. SNT is a mediation device suggested by Roger Fisher.10 During negotia-
tion, the mediator first devises and proposes a deal ~SNT-1! for the two bargainers
to consider. The mediator is not trying to promote the first proposal; rather, it is
meant to serve as an initial, single negotiation text—a version to be criticized by
both parties and then modified in an iterative manner. Modifications to the SNT-1
will be made by the mediator based on the criticisms from the two sides. Thus,
both parties need to reveal ~aspects of! their preferences to the mediator; hence,
trust becomes an important issue. Furthermore, additional costs are often involved
with a mediator.
The orthogonal-DF method is somewhat related to the work of Ehtamo et al.3,4
They develop the method of improving directions, which is a mathematical formal-
izationoftheSNTmethod~withamediator!.Inessenceitisamulticriteriadecision-
making gradient search method. Given an SNT, bargainers give their most preferred
direction of the next SNT, which is just the gradient. The mediator then uses some
relatively straightforward procedure to determine the jointly improving direction
that is then used to determine the next SNT. The orthogonal-DF also searches for
such a jointly improving direction, but without the use of a mediator.
3. NEGOTIATING ABOUTAN n-PART TARIFF
A typical businesses practice is to use an instance of an n-part tariff as the
nonnegotiable subscription fee. Based on the observations discussed in the follow-
ing two subsections, we can conclude that, for most practical applications, it suf-
fices to focus on a two-part tariff when negotiating about a tariff. In the remainder
of this article, we therefore focus on software agents negotiating about a two-part
tariff.
3.1. Win–Win Opportunities
An advantage of negotiating about a two-part tariff is that, unlike a one-part
tariff,win–winopportunitiesarepossible.Thiswin–winorPareto-efficiencyaspect
arises due to the fact that, unlike one-issue negotiation, trade-offs between issues
can be made. Mutually beneficial trade-offs are possible, for example, when seller
and buyer predict the quantity the buyer will purchase, differently. Consequently,
buyer ~seller! can be indifferent between certain fixed and variable price combi-
nations whereas the opponent strictly prefers one of these combinations over the
other.
These win–win opportunities can arise whenever buyer and seller negotiate
about an n-part tariff ~for any n  1!. Two-part tariffs are, however, commonly
used as a subscription fee; customers will generally be familiar with the pricing
scheme. Due to this familiarity and the limited complexity of the scheme, it will
be relatively straightforward for a customer to instruct an agent to negotiate on his
AUTOMATED MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION 103
International Journal of Intelligent Systems DOI 10.1002/intbehalf, that is, preference elicitation11 is less of an issue than when negotiation is
about more complex tariffs. Moreover, often more complex tariffs will generate
very few additional win–win opportunities; the magnitude of these extra win–win
opportunities depends on the extent to which both negotiators believe higher order
tariff changes ~such as changes in the variable price! influence the ~expected! quan-
tity or quality purchased by the buyer.
3.2. Price Discrimination
Charging a nonnegotiable two-part tariff is especially a natural choice in case
of uncertainty in the quantity or quality customers will choose to purchase ~e.g.,
minutes called in a month, in the case of a network operator for a mobile phone!.
Typically, businesses use more complex nonnegotiable tariff schemes to apply price
discrimination, that is, charging different prices to different customers. They offer
customers a menu of options where a nonnegotiable tariff assigns a price to each
option in the menu. Customers can then self-select the best purchase ~cf. Refs. 12–
15!.A nn-part tariff can, for example, be used to introduce quantity discounts,
where the variable price declines in successive intervals~see Figure 1a for an exam-
ple with a four-part tariff!.
In this article, we introduce the possibility of negotiating about the tariff.
Price discrimination is now no longer a motive for introducing more complex tar-
iffs, because negotiating about a two-part tariff can have the same discriminative
power as a nonnegotiable m1-part tariff ~where m is equal to the total number of
customers!. To see this, note that negotiating with m customers about a two-part
tariff can result in m different two-part tariffs. Moreover for any n 1-part tariff
there exist n two-part tariffs ~with n  1! that, given rational behavior, will result
in an equivalent revenue ~cf. Ref. 12!. Thus, negotiating with m customers about
their two-part tariff can mimic the situation of a nonnegotiable m 1-part tariff.
Figure 1 illustrates this revenue equivalence between a m 1-part tariff and
m two-part tariffs: Figure 1a depicts a four-part tariff with one fixed price and,
depending on the quantity purchased, three different variable prices; Figure 1b
depicts the corresponding 3 two-part tariffs with one fixed and one variable price.
Arational customer will be indifferent between either the 3 two-part tariffs or the
four-part tariff. Faced with the 3 two-part tariffs, in Figure 1b, a rational customer
~who spends the smallest amount possible to buy the desired goods! will only
consider the solid parts of the 3 two-part tariffs, which is the four-part tariff in
Figure 1a. Consequently, both the four-part and the 3 two-part tariffs will result in
the same revenue.
4. AGENTS AND BARGAINING PROTOCOL
4.1. Bargaining Protocol
Following Ref. 16, bargaining occurs in an alternating exchange of offers and
counteroffers, typically initiated by the customer.An offer specifies the fixed price
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able price gives the price for every unit purchased. Attached to an offer are pre-
conditions that specify until when the offer is valid. We call the offer combined
with the preconditions a proposal.The bargaining process continues until an agree-
ment is reached or one of the bargainers terminates the process. Based on this
bargaining process, Figure 2 depicts the alternating-offers bargaining protocol a
customer agent and seller agent use to do the actual bargaining.
Figure 1. ~a!A4-part tariff. ~b! The corresponding 3 two-part tariffs ~dotted lines!; labels ~1!,
~2!, and ~3! identify the two-part tariffs that correspond to the line segments of the four-part
tariff. When faced with the 3 two-part tariffs in ~b!, a rational customer will only consider the
solid parts of the 3 two-part tariffs, which is the four-part tariff in ~a!.
AUTOMATED MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION 105
International Journal of Intelligent Systems DOI 10.1002/int4.2. Agents
4.2.1. Seller Agent
Bargaining with a customer is done based on the seller agent’s desired aspi-
ration level expressed in expected utils. We define the expected utility Us of the
seller agent as the expected revenue from selling a tariff ~pf,pv!, where pf denotes
the fixed and pv the variable price, that is,
Us  pf  pv{rs~pv!~ 1!
where rs~pv! denotes the expected number of additional units consumed for a
variable price of pv.
4.2.2. Customer Agent
The customer agent acts on behalf of the customer.The customer can indicate
her preferences by specifying the number of units she expects to purchase rc and a
maximum budget bmax.The budget provides the agent with a mandate for the nego-
tiation; the total expected costs should not exceed bmax. As an approximation of a
customer’s utility, the agent uses the following function whenever a deal is closed:
Uc  bmax  ~pf  pv{rc!~ 2!
Figure 2. The bilateral bargaining protocol of alternating offers: numbers 1, 2, and 3 mark the
first, second, and third offers submitted in a sequence of three offers: the second and third offers
are the counteroffers to the first and second offers. After the third offer, the process repeats
itself.
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disagreement.
5. DECOMPOSING BARGAINING STRATEGY
We decompose bargaining strategies into concession strategies and “Pareto-
search” methods. Concession strategies determine what the desired utility level of
an offer will be, given a particular sequence of offers and counteroffers. Heuristics
that implement Pareto-search methods determine, for a particular utility level and
a particular history of offers and counteroffers, what the multi-issue offer will be,
that is, the fixed price pf and the variable price pv of the two part tariff. In terms of
a multivariable utility function, a counteroffer entails both a movement off the
iso-utility line and a movement along the iso-utility line. ~Given a specified utility
level, an iso-utility line specifies all the pf and pv points that generate the same
utility.! Concessionstrategiesdeterminethemovementofaniso-utilityline;Pareto-
search strategies determine the movement along an iso-utility line.
Pareto-search methods aim at reaching agreement as soon as the respective
“concession” strategies permit this. Therefore, it may be good for both parties to
use it. In more economic terms a negotiated tariff is called Pareto efficient if it is
impossible to change the tariff without making one of the bargainers worse off,
that is, one of the bargainers will always attach a lower ~or equal! utility to the
adjusted tariff. From a system design perspective, Pareto efficiency of the negoti-
ated tariffs is clearly desirable.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF search
methods, two Pareto-search methods. The experiments in Section 7 show that if
the customer agent uses one Pareto-search method and the seller agent uses the
other one—while both simultaneously make concessions—then the bargaining out-
come will closely approximate a Pareto-efficient solution for a wide variety of
concession strategies.
5.1. Orthogonal Search
Both customer agent and seller agent may use—what we call—an orthogonal
strategy as the Pareto-search algorithm. This strategy is probably best explained
through an example. Suppose the customer ~with whom the seller bargains over
the tariff! placed the tth offer of ~pf~t!,pv~t!!. Moreover, the seller’s concession
strategy dictates a utility level of Us~t  1!, that is, in utils the ~counter! offer
should be worth Us~t1!. Based on this information the orthogonal strategy deter-
mines ~pf~t 1!,pv~t 1!!, the counteroffer of the seller, by choosing a ~pf,pv!
combination that generates Us~t1! utils and lies closest ~measured in Euclidean
distance! to the point ~pf~t!,pv~t!!. Figure 3 gives the graphical representation of
the orthogonal strategy.
The use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties results in a mapping f from
a bargainer’s desired utility level at t to the desired utility level at t  2. Given
convex preferences ~cf. Ref. 17! and fixed desired utility levels, the mapping f can
be shown to satisfy the Lipschitz condition 7 f~x!f~y!7  7xy7 for all x and y
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the orthogonal strategy does imply that consecutive offers do not diverge. Figure 4
illustrates the use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties for the case of tangent
iso-utility lines. It depicts a sequence of two offers and counteroffers with convex
preferences and a fixed aspiration level. ~Us and Uc denote the iso-utility lines of
the seller and customer, respectively.! The figure illustrates, for instance, how the
customer’s offer at time 1 ~with aspiration level Uc~1!Uc! is transformed into an
offer at time 3 ~with aspiration level Uc~3!  Uc!.
5.2. Orthogonal-DF Search
The use of just the orthogonal strategy by both parties may lead to very slow
convergence to Pareto-efficient bargaining outcomes. To speed up the conver-
gence process we can add an amplifying mechanism to the orthogonal method.As
the amplifying mechanism, we use the derivative follower with adaptive step size
~ADF!. ~Henceforth we will call this the orthogonal-DF.!
The derivative follower ~DF! is a local search algorithm ~cf. Ref. 19!. The
DF modifies the variable price pv found by the orthogonal strategy by either in-
creasing or decreasing pv with a step-size d  0 in the direction sdr  $1,1%.
bThe proof is a straightforward application of convex analysis ~cf. Ref. 18! given that,
without loss of generality, we can assume that the preferences are bounded.That is, negative and
extremely high ~pf~t!,pv~t!! combinations can be discarded, without loss of generality.
Figure 3. Example of orthogonal strategy, which determines ~pf~t 1!,pv~t 1!!, the coun-
teroffer of the seller, by choosing a ~pf,pv! combination that generates Us~t 1! utils and lies
closest ~measured in Euclidean distance! to the point ~pf~t!,pv~t!!.
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last time the DF increased the price pv ~i.e., sdr  1!. The DF then continues to
increase the price whenever the opponent’s last offer lies “closer” to the current
iso-utility level than the opponent’s before last offer; otherwise the DF changes
the search direction by setting sdr equal to 1. ~The current iso-utility curve spec-
ifies all ~pf,pv! combinations that resulted in the utility currently desired.! We say
that a DF “turns” whenever it adjust the search direction.Algorithm 1 specifies the
orthogonal-DFingreaterdetailandFigure5illustratestheuseoftheorthogonal-DF
by the seller ~the customer uses the orthogonal strategy only!.
Algorithm 1: The orthogonal-DF algorithm. The following is given: ~a! the
opponent’s last and before last offer O1  ~pf~t!,pv~t!! and O2  ~pf~t  2!,
pv~t  2!!, respectively; ~b! bargainer’s utility function u~pf,pv! and next aspira-
tion level U~t1!; ~c! the step-size d; and ~d! the search direction sdr  $1,1%.
Based on this information the orthogonal-DF computes the next counteroffer
O  ~pf~t 1!, pv~t 1!!.
~1! Use the orthogonal strategy to compute O1
'  ~pf
'~t!,pv
'~t!! and O2
'  ~pf
'~t  2!,
pv
'~t  2!!, that is, the points in the ~pf,pv! plane that generate U~t 1! utils and lie
closest to O1 and O2, respectively.
~2! Compute d1 and d2, the distance of the opponent’s last two offers, that is,
d1  7O1  O1
' 7 and d2  7O2  O2
' 7 ~7{7 denotes Euclidian distance!.
~3! Update sdr:Whenever d1  d2, the orthogonal-DF “turns,” that is, sdr1{sdr; other-
wise sdr  sdr.
Figure 4. Example of the use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties for a sequence of two
offers and counteroffers, with fixed aspiration levels and convex preferences. The combination
~pf
*,pv
*! denotes a Pareto-efficient tariff.
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directly after a turn d is not increased, and otherwise d is increased ~cf. Ref. 20 for
the details!.
~5! Compute the counteroffer O  ~pf~t 1!, pv~t 1!!:S e tpv~t 1!  pv
'~t!  d{sdr.
Next choose pf~t  1! such that, given pv~t  1!, the counteroffer generates
U~t 1! utils.
The orthogonal-DF uses the ADF. The difference between ADF and DF is
that the step-size d becomes adaptive.20,21 We use the ADF proposed in Ref. 20.
The ADF starts by ~exponentially! increasing the step-size d as long as it contin-
ues to search in the same direction. After a turn occurs ~i.e., it changes the search
direction!, the ADF reduces its step size ~exponentially!. Because a turn typically
signals that an optimum has been passed, the ADF does not increase the step size
for a number of steps directly after a turn ~to avoid a repeating “overshoot” of
the optimum!. This pause in increasing the step size is set long enough such that,
within the vicinity of an optimum, the ADF does not increase its step size. Con-
sequently, the ADF converges very quickly to local optima whenever the optimi-
zation problem is static ~cf. Ref. 20 for the proofs!. Due to concessions, finding
a Pareto-efficient deal is not necessarily a static problem. Using the ADF as an
amplifier for the orthogonal method can still work very well, however. Opponent’s
concessions can cause the orthogonal-DF to overshoot an optimum a bit more
than it otherwise would. Because it increases the step size exponentially, it will,
however, turn almost as quickly. Consequently, concession may cause very little
loss in performance.
Figure 5. Sequence of two offers and counteroffers with fixed aspiration levels where the
seller uses the orthogonal-DF and the customer only uses the orthogonal strategy.
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To fully appreciate the Pareto-search methods developed in Section 5, it is
insightfultoconsiderothertechniquesascandidatePareto-searchmethods.Inspirit,
the work of Faratin et al.2 is probably most closely related to the methods devel-
oped in Section 5. Their algorithm is, however, specifically designed to handle
~and exploit! discrete issues and moreover is limited to a linear additive utility
function ~see also Section 2!. Our methods are designed to handle ~and exploit!
continuous issues and nonlinear/general utility functions.Therefore, a direct com-
parison is not possible. Other techniques developed in the multi-issue negotiation
literature assume a mediator ~see also Section 2!; therefore they also do not qual-
ify as candidate Pareto-search methods.c Due to a lack of comparable techniques
in the multi-issue negotiation literature, we will focus instead on more standard
numerical techniques in this section.
To understand which type of standard techniques are most appropriate, we
explain in Section 6.1 the strong links between the Pareto-search problem and
finding a minimum of a one-dimensional function ~without using derivatives!. Sub-
sequently, in Section 6.2 we suggest the downhill simplex method as a potentially
good alternative to especially the orthogonal-DF Pareto-search method. In the
experiments reported in Section 7.3, we actually use the downhill simplex method
as a benchmark. In Section 6.3, we briefly explain why we do not consider candi-
date Pareto-search methods that explicitly take into account the effect concessions
have on the location of Pareto-efficient offers.
6.1. Minimizing a Convex Function
In computer experiments reported in Section 7.3, both seller and customer
have convex preferences. In the absence of concessions, finding Pareto-efficient
solutions can, consequently, be interpreted as finding an ~absolute! minimum of a
convex one-dimensional function f. Moreover, the effect of one negotiator—say
the customer—using the orthogonal strategy is that the seller gets consistent feed-
back. This feedback can be interpreted as evaluations of the function f at various
points in its domain. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this correspondence between find-
ing a Pareto-efficient solution and minimizing a convex function f: Figure 6 gives
the bargaining setup and Figure 7 the corresponding minimization problem.
In Figure 6, Us and Uc denote the seller’s and customer’s iso-utility lines. The
numbers 1 and 2 indicate the seller’s offer and the customer’s corresponding coun-
teroffer. ~The arrow highlights the sequence of events.! Figure 7 depicts the func-
tion f. We assume ~without loss of generality! that the seller determines pv, the
variablepricefirst;thecorrespondingfixedpricefollowsdirectlyfromtheiso-utility
cWe may be able to translate the idea in Ref. 9 of using annealers to our non-single-
negotiation text setting and subsequently make an experimental comparison. However, their
approach is specifically designed for contracts with many issues ~like, e.g., 100 or more issues!
as opposed to our approach, where we aim for reaching high-quality outcomes in only a few
rounds, for a limited number of issues.
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Us and Uc denote the seller’s and customer’s aspiration levels. The numbers 1 and 2 indicate the
seller’s offer and the customer’s corresponding counteroffer; dis' denotes the difference between
the two offers. Moreover, ~pf
*,pv
*! denotes the Pareto-efficient shop offer and dis* the distance
to the corresponding Pareto-efficient customer offer.
Figure 7. Depiction of the convex one-dimensional function f that corresponds to the Pareto-
search problem depicted in Figure 6. For the Pareto-efficient shop offer ~pf
*,pv
*!, we have
f~pv!  dis*; dis* is the distance to the corresponding Pareto-efficient customer offer. More-
over, f~pv
'!  dis', which is the distance between offers 1 and 2 in Figure 6.
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represents a Pareto improvement; that is, ~pf
',pv
'! represent a Pareto improvement
over ~pf,pv! if and only if f~pv
'!  f~pv!.
6.2. Standard Minimization Techniques
Thus, in the absence of concessions, the seller can find Pareto-efficient deals
by minimizing the corresponding convex function f. For this problem, we can use
standardnumericaltechniquesforminimizationwithoutderivatives~combinedwith
the orthogonal method to transform the problem to minimizing f !. These tech-
niques require function evaluations only ~as oppose to information about the deriv-
ative of f ! because negotiators do not know f; all they can get are point evaluations
of f, by considering the distance between a seller’s offer and customer’s correspond-
ing offer ~see Section 6.1!. Brent’s method is such a standard technique. This tech-
nique is an obvious choice because of its very good convergence properties ~cf.
Refs. 22 and 23!. Roughly, the idea of Brent’s method is to combines golden sec-
tion search with parabolic interpolation.
Conducted computer experiments confirm that Brent’s method works very
well, as long as bargainers do not make any concession ~i.e., the iso-utility line
remains fixed throughout the bargaining process!. ~However, the Pareto-search
methods developed in Section 5 perform just as well.! In the experiments, the
customer and seller use the orthogonal strategy and Brent’s method, respectively.
As soon as bargainers start making concessions, the performance of the orthogo-
nal strategy combined with Brent’s method deteriorates. An essential aspect of
Brent’s method is the bracketing of the optimum: Through successive steps it tries
to decrease the interval in which the optimum is know to lie. This bracketing of
the optimum is hard to maintain when bargainers make concessions. In that case,
the curvature and optimum of f may change through time. Consequently, the opti-
mum may no longer lie in the bracket interval.
Thus Brent’s method is ill suited to serve as an alternative for the Pareto-
search method developed in Section 5. The downhill simplex method ~DSM! is
another well known and widely used optimization technique. ~Note that DSM is
unrelated to the simplex method of linear programming.! It is a multidimensional
optimization method. Like Brent’s method, it does only require function evalua-
tions, not derivatives. Unlike Brent’s method, it does not require the bracketing of
the minimum. This makes the DSM better suited to handle nonstationarity. Given
an n-dimensional problem space, the DSM must be started with n1 points, defin-
ing an initial simplex. For these points, it gets the corresponding function values.
By manipulating the shape of the simplex, the algorithm searches for the point that
results in the lowest value of f. For further details on the DSM see Ref. 23. In
Section 7.3 we report on the experiments conducted with the DSM. In these ex-
periments one bargainer ~typically the customer! uses orthogonal search. On the
other hand, the seller uses the orthogonal-DSM, that is, orthogonal search to obtain
function evaluations of f and the DSM to find a minimum of f ~i.e., a Pareto-
efficient offer!.
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Note that all the Pareto-search methods developed in Section 5 do not explic-
itly take into account the effect concessions ~especially made by the opponent! can
have on the location of Pareto-efficient offers. To take into account these effects
requires elaborate opponent modeling, and updating of these models through trial
and error. Given uncertainty about the opponent’s preferences, opponent model-
ing can only be fruitful if seller and buyer negotiate very frequently with one
another. Second, negotiators should be able to identify each other ~e.g., on the web
a person can often conceal his identity!. Third, updating a model of the opponent
is difficult because a bargainer needs to disentangle the concession and Pareto-
improvement effects.
Despite ~or because of! these concerns, opponent modeling is still an inter-
esting line of research. In this article, the focus lies on a Pareto-search method that
does not require opponent modeling, however. Consequently, we limit our search
for appropriate alternative Pareto-search methods to techniques that also do not
require opponent modeling.
7. EXPERIMENTAL SETUPAND RESULTS
As discussed in Section 5, negotiation essentially consists of two strategic
aspects: the concession of the agents and the Pareto-search method. In this section
we focus on the latter aspect of the negotiations. By means of computer experi-
ments, we investigate the effectiveness and robustness of the orthogonal and
orthogonal-DF approaches to find Pareto-efficient solutions for a wide variety of
settings. We evaluate the robustness of the search strategy by experimenting with
various concession strategies on the customer side.
Section 4.2 provides a general specification of the customer agent and the
seller agent. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 describe the agent settings that are specifically
used within the experimental setup. In particular the agents’preferences and con-
cession strategies are specified in detail in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. The
experimental results are discussed in Section 7.3.
7.1. Agent Preference Settings
We simulate the negotiation with a variety of customer and seller prefer-
ences, expressed by the agents’ utility functions. The customer agent’s expected
utility depends on rc, the total number of articles the customer expects to pur-
chase ~see also Section 4.2.2!. The value rc is assumed to be a constant, set ran-
domly between 1 and 20 at the beginning of the experiment. Note that this results
in a linear iso-utility curve in the ~pf,pv! plane ~see, e.g., Figure 4!. Furthermore,
because the purpose is to demonstrate the efficiency of the final deals reached, we
set the customer agent’s mandate bmax for the bundle such that an agreement is
always reached.
The expected utility ~i.e., expected revenue! for the seller agent is based on
rs, the expected number of articles that the customers will purchase on average.
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of the variable price pv. It is assumed that customers who are willing to pay a high
variable price are expected to read less than customers with a low variable price
~i.e., we assume the law of demand holds; see Ref. 17!. In the experiments we use
the linear function rs~pv!  b  a{pv with b  20 and a set randomly between
0.03 and 0.07 at the beginning of an experiment. Note that the seller’s iso-utility
curve is now convex ~toward the origin!.
7.2. Concession Strategies
The customers and the seller can each select their own concession strategies.
Although a seller’s concession in the main system can depend on the behavior of
all customers ~i.e., one to many!, in the experiments the seller agent’s strategy is
simply to decrease the desired utility level or aspiration level with a fixed amount
each round. The initial aspiration level is randomly varied. Note that the number
of customers and their behavior does not affect the seller’s concession when this
strategy is used.
On the customer side, on the other hand, we implemented four classes of
concession strategies to investigate the robustness of the Pareto-search method:
~1! Hardhead. The customer agent does not concede when this strategy is used; the aspi-
ration level remains the same during the negotiations.
~2! Fixed. A fixed amount c in utils is conceded each round.
~3! Fraction. The customer concedes the fraction g of the difference between the current
desired utility level and the utility of the opponent’s last offer.
~4! Tit-for-tat. This strategy mimics the concession behavior of the opponent, based on
subjective utility improvement. If the utility level of the seller’s offers increases, the
same amount is conceded by the customer. Note that it is the increment in the utility
level perceived by the customer. The seller’s actual concession is shielded from the
customer agent, as an improvement could also occur when the seller moves along his
iso-utility curve. Furthermore, note that the perceived utility improvement could also
be negative. To make the concession behavior less chaotic, no negative concessions
are made by the customer.
7.3. Results
In the experiments, the seller and customer negotiate in an alternating fashion
until an agreement is reached. The efficiency of the agreement is then evaluated
based on the distance of the final offer from a Pareto-efficient solution. We mea-
sure an offer’s distance from a Pareto-efficient solution as the maximum possible
utility improvement for the customer if a Pareto-efficient offer was made, all else
remaining equal. To evaluate the quality of the results we compare the outcomes
using various search strategies and concession strategies of the customer. Tables I
and II provide an overview of the results. The row labeled “Random” in Table II
contains the outcomes when both seller and customer use a random search strat-
egy. This strategy selects a random point on the iso-utility curve.d The distance of
dOnly the downward sloping part of the seller’s iso-utility curve is used.
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mumParetoinefficiency~thatispossiblewhenkeepingtheseller’siso-utilityfixed!.
Although the inefficiency with random search is only small compared to the
maximum inefficiency, even better results are obtained when one bargainer ~typi-
cally the customer! uses orthogonal search and the other ~the seller! uses
orthogonal-DF search ~i.e., orthogonal search combined with a derivative fol-
lower!. The results are shown in the column labeled “Orthogonal/DF” of Table I.
The improvements are considerable. The performance is up to more than six times
better than using the random cooperative strategy. The distance of the final offer
as a percentage of maximum Pareto inefficiency lies now between 1 and 4%.
TableIIshowstheresultsifbothcustomerandselleruseorthogonal-DFsearch
~column DF/DF!. The distance of the final offer lies between 2 and 9% of the
maximum Pareto inefficiency. These results are slightly worse than random. The
derivative follower relies on a consistent response from the opponent to signal the
right direction. If both use a derivative follower, this signal is distorted.
Table I. Average distance from the Pareto-efficient solution for various customer concession
strategies ~rows! and customer/seller search strategies ~columns!. Results are averaged over
5000 experiments with random parameter settings. Standard deviations are indicated in
parentheses. Best results ~see column Orthogonal/DF! are obtained if the customer and
seller use orthogonal search and the seller’s search is amplified with a derivative follower.
Concession strategy Orthogonal/DF search Random search
Hardhead 3.64 ~68.75! 18.81 ~626.86!
Fixed ~c  20! 14.15 ~619.91! 27.61 ~637.10!
Fixed ~c  40! 22.77 ~628.71! 34.40 ~645.38!
Fixed ~c  80! 35.22 ~645.42! 44.53 ~659.61!
Fraction ~g 0.025! 7.27 ~614.98! 25.57 ~634.89!
Fraction ~g 0.05! 8.33 ~615.64! 29.99 ~641.11!
Fraction ~g 0.1! 17.80 ~644.28! 36.00 ~650.09!
Tit-for-tat 20.73 ~626.59! 35.91 ~647.59!
Table II. Average distance from the Pareto-efficient solution for various customer
concession strategies ~rows! and customer/seller search strategies ~columns!. Results are
averaged over 5000 experiments with random parameter settings. Standard deviations are
indicated in parentheses.
Concession strategy DF/DF search Orthogonal/DSM search
Hardhead 19.98 ~623.92! 31.01 ~645.11!
Fixed ~c  20! 48.04 ~692.28! 41.33 ~656.15!
Fixed ~c  40! 70.25 ~6144.92! 49.64 ~666.94!
Fixed ~c  80! 72.30 ~6137.69! 57.79 ~678.72!
Fraction ~g 0.025! 20.91 ~637.15! 38.94 ~653.92!
Fraction ~g 0.05! 21.67 ~641.52! 44.87 ~666.22!
Fraction ~g 0.1! 36.90 ~665.16! 50.37 ~675.46!
Tit-for-tat 34.52 ~650.04! 44.17 ~655.48!
116 SOMEFUN, GERDING, AND LA POUTRÉ
International Journal of Intelligent Systems DOI 10.1002/intAdditionally, the column labeled “Orthogonal/DSM” of Table II shows the
results if one bargainer ~typically the customer! uses orthogonal search and the
other ~the seller! uses the orthogonal-DSM ~i.e., orthogonal search combined with
the downhill simplex method; see Section 6!. The distance of the final offer lies
between 5 and 9% of the maximum Pareto inefficiency. These results are slightly
worse than the DF/DF and much worse than the results of the Orthogonal/DF
reported in Table I.
The orthogonal-DSM search performs much worse than the orthogonal-DF
search ~both are combined with the orthogonal search!. The simplicity of the DF
with adaptive step size, which underlies the orthogonal-DF search, is also its
strength: It stores much less information ~storage requirement are kept to a mini-
mum! and updates this information more frequently than the DSM, which under-
lies the orthogonal-DSM search. Consequently, the DF ~with adaptive step size!
handles nonstationarity much better than the DSM.
The standard deviations reported in Tables I and II are relatively large ~this is
probably due to the fact that concessions are being made!. However, this does not
necessarily weaken our conclusions because the standard deviations are high for
all the results reported. Indeed, using the t-test for population average confirms
that, with a 0.9995 confidence, we can accept the hypothesis that the average dis-
tance for the orthogonal/DF search is smaller than the corresponding average dis-
tance for the random, DF/DF, and orthogonal/DSM searches.e
Notice that the average distance depends on the concession strategy used by
the customer.Although in individual cases Pareto-efficient agreements ~with zero
distance! are reached using the orthogonal/DF search, the average distance con-
sistently shows some ~usually slight! inefficiencies, even when the customer makes
no concessions ~i.e., the hardhead strategy!. The reason for this is twofold. First,
the DF accelerates finding the efficient solution by making, at times, large steps
on the iso-utility curve.At a certain point the algorithm passes the Pareto-efficient
point, and then turns.This way the offers keep oscillating around the optimal point.
If the concessions are sufficiently large, an agreement can be reached at a point
that is less than optimal.
Second, the direction and step size of the DF are based on changes in the
Euclidean distance between the seller and customer offers through time. The dis-
tance can be influenced by both concessions and movements along the iso-utility
curve. As the opponent’s iso-utility curve is unknown, the agents are unable to
distinguish between the two. This can mislead the DF whenever concessions are
very large. Two possible solutions are to make either small concessions or have
intervals with no concessions, allowing the search algorithm to find the best deal.
To conclude, the orthogonal/DF strategy clearly outperforms other combina-
tions of search strategies in the experiments. Inefficiencies still occur, especially if
eLet ma, sa
2, and na denote the sample mean, standard deviations, and number of elements
of sample a; moreover, mb, sb
2, and nb are defined similarly for sample b. Then the test value t is
defined as t  ~ma  mb!/~~sa
2/na!  sb
2/nb!1/2. ~Note that degrees of freedom are not really an
issue with na  nb  5000.!
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ment fast ~by making large concessions! and reaching an efficient agreement.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In particular, so-called information goods mark an application area where
bargaining may be beneficial. Information goods are often sold through on-line
services where customers pay a nonnegotiable subscription fee. Especially, with a
high heterogeneity among customers and a lot of dynamics in customer prefer-
ences, offering standardized nonnegotiable subscriptions may not be the best solu-
tion. Negotiating has, conversely, the advantage of providing more flexibility and
adaptability toward the preferences of individual customers and daily dynamics.
In this article, we therefore consider the problem of a seller and customer agent
negotiating about the subscription fee of such an on-line service.
We point out in the article that for most practical applications, it suffices to
concentrate on negotiating about a two-part tariff. Consequently, the focus in the
remainder of the article lies on negotiating about a two-part tariff. Autonomous
software agents execute the negotiation on behalf of the bargainers. To perform
the actual negotiation these agents make use of bargaining strategies. We present a
decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-
efficient search methods.An important technical contribution of the article lies in
the development of two Pareto-search methods: the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF
methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the
respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two bargainers results in
very efficient bargaining outcomes, while negotiators concede the amount speci-
fied by their concession strategy.
An interesting extension of our work will be to develop the orthogonal-DF
for multi-issue negotiation with more than two issues. Moreover, it will be inter-
esting to investigate the performance of such a search method experimentally.
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